听说英达洗钱被抓的事，查了下。顺便记录并普法。根据检控书，相关事实如下： 1）英达的收入来源是中国，老婆孩子在美国，英达在中国将 RMB 换成 100 美元的美钞；并且 2）将这些美金拿到美国，存入6个银行账号，每次存钱恰好少于 1万美金。 另外还有逃税的问题（但这不在其刑事指控中）。 上述行为违反 31 USC S 5324(a)(3) 以及 31 USC S 5324(d)(2) 条款分别如下: Domestic Coin and Currency Transactions Involving Financial Institutions.— No person shall, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such section, the reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed by any order issued under section 5326, or the recordkeeping requirements imposed by any regulation prescribed under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law 91–508 — ... structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions. Enhanced penalty for aggravated cases.— Whoever violates this section while violating another law of the United States or as part of a pattern of any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period shall be fined twice the amount provided in subsection (b)(3) or (c)(3) (as the case may be) of section 3571 of title 18 , United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. 附件：刑事起诉书 show_temp.pdf 认罪合同 show_temp (1).pdf U.S. District Court United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (New Haven) CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:17-cr-00034-SRU All Defendants Case title: USA v. Ying Date Filed: 02/16/2017 Assigned to: Judge Stefan R. Underhill Defendant (1) Da Ying representedby Nathan M. Silverstein Silverstein Osach 234 Church St., Suite 903 PO Box 1727 New Haven, CT 06510 203-865-0121 Fax: 203-865-0255 Email: nsilverstein@so-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: Retained Ronald C. Osach Silverstein Osach 234 Church St., Po Box 1727 Suite 903 New Haven, CT 06510 203-865-0121 Fax: 203-865-0255 Email: rosach@so-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: Retained Pending Counts Disposition STRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS TO EVADE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. Engaging in a pattern of financial transactions to evade reporting requirements. (1) Highest Offense Level (Opening) Felony Terminated Counts Disposition None Highest Offense Level (Terminated) None Complaints Disposition None Plaintiff USA representedby Peter S. Jongbloed U.S. Attorney's Office-NH 157 Church St., 25th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 203-821-3742 Fax: 203-773-5378 Email: Peter.Jongbloed@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: Retained Date Filed # Docket Text 02/16/2017 1 INFORMATION as to Da Ying (1) count(s) 1. (Jaiman, R.) Modified on 2/22/2017 (Jaiman, R.). (Entered: 02/21/2017) 02/16/2017 2 WAIVER OF INDICTMENT by Da Ying (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 02/21/2017) 02/16/2017 3 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Stefan R. Underhill: Initial Appearance, Waiver/Plea Hearing as to Da Ying held on 2/16/2017, Plea of Guilty entered to count 1. by Da Ying, ( Sentencing set for 5/11/2017 11:30 AM in Courtroom One, 915 Lafayette Blvd., Bridgeport, CT before Judge Stefan R. Underhill) Total Time: 1 hours and 07 minutes(Court Reporter Masse. S.)(Jaiman, R.) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/22/2017: # 1 CORRECTED MINUTES) (Jaiman, R.). Modified on 2/23/2017 (Jaiman, R.). (Entered: 02/21/2017) 02/16/2017 4 PLEA AGREEMENT as to Da Ying (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 02/21/2017) 02/16/2017 5 ELECTRONIC FILING ORDER as to Da Ying - PLEASE ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH COURTESY COPY REQUIREMENTS IN THIS ORDER Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/16/2017. (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 02/21/2017) 02/16/2017 7 ORDER OF REFERRAL TO PROBATION FOR PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND REPORT as to Da Ying. First Disclosure-PSI due 3/30/2017; Objections Due 4/13/2017; 2nd-Disclosure PSI due 4/23/2017; Sentencing Memorandum due 7 days before sentencing; Response due 4 days before sentencing; Sentencing set for 5/11/2017 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom One, 915 Lafayette Blvd., Bridgeport, CT before Judge Stefan R. Underhill Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/16/2017. (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 02/22/2017) 02/21/2017 6 NOTICE OF E-FILED CALENDAR as to Da Ying: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. Sentencing set for 5/11/2017 11:30 AM in Courtroom One, 915 Lafayette Blvd., Bridgeport, CT before Judge Stefan R. Underhill (Jaiman, R.) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
I-V characteristics and differential conductance fluctuations of Au nanowires https://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0106027.pdf we follow the work of Yue et. al.71 by assuming a strong interaction and write the renormalized transmission coefficient as5
http://www.iasd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/4-07cv444-69.pdf 4-07cv444-69.pdf Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F. 3d 462 - Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 2003 he Sheriff cross-appeals, arguing that he should have been awarded all his attorney's fees, and not merely those incurred in bringing the successful motion for dismissal. The Sheriff argues that such full reimbursement is required by the text of Rule 37. However, Rule 37 supports only the reimbursement of fees resulting from the discovery violation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) (allowing courts to require "payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure ") (emphasis added). As long as the suit as a whole was not frivolous, and we have no reason to believe that it was, the remaining attorney's fees would have been incurred even without the discovery violation; thus, the causality requirement was not met. http://www.iasd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/409cv185_0910.pdf 409cv185_0910.pdf Pursuant to Rule 37(d), the moving party may recover from a party who fails to attend a properly noticed deposition the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, “caused by the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3). Here, however, HSBC Defendants have requested more than the expenses they incurred as a result of Plaintiffs’ failure to attend their depositions. Defendants’ request for fees includes time spent reviewing pleadings, initial disclosures, and other discovery in preparation to take the deposition. Defendants also request fees for time expended preparing the notice of deposition and for scheduling the deposition. These events predate Plaintiffs’ failure to attend the deposition and thus cannot logically be caused by the failure. Such costs are not properly compensable according to the plain meaning of 37(d)(3). See Ranger Transportation, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 903 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining to award expenses incurred preparing for an aborted deposition, holding that movant incurred no recoverable expenses upon nonmoving party’s failure to attend deposition, where movant was able to take other depositions the same day); Criterion 508 Solutions, Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Servs., 255 F.R.D. 489, 496 (S.D. Ia. 2008) (charges incurred for time spent had the deposition proceeded as planned are not caused by the failure). Likewise, expenses Defendants incurred traveling to and from the aborted deposition were not caused by the failure and therefore are not compensable. See Gamblin v. Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 3:07CV698 HTW-LRA, 2010 WL 1780221, at *10 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 30, 2010) (characterizing expenses incurred traveling to an aborted deposition as preparatory); Vision Ctr. Nw., Inc., v. Vision Value LLC, No. 3:07-CV-183 RLM, 2008 WL 4276240, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2008) (distinguishing between travel expenses incurred in preparation for an aborted deposition and those incurred in preparation for the resultant motion for sanctions). With these principles in mind, the Court holds the causal event and the appropriate reference point from which recoverable fees and costs began accruing was Plaintiffs’ failure to attend the deposition. HSBC Defendants did not prepare for the deposition, notice the deposition, schedule the deposition, or travel to and from Des Moines for the deposition as a result of Plaintiffs’ failure to attend. Therefore, none of these costs is recoverable. Defendants’ request for fees is accordingly reduced by a total of 9.2 hours1 , and requested mileage costs with respect to the deposition are denied. Costs and fees associated with making a record at the aborted deposition, including the cost of the court reporter, as well as fees associated with researching and drafting subsequent related motions to compel, to dismiss, and to reset case progression dates are recoverable. Defendants may also recover fees and costs incurred preparing for, traveling to, and attending the July 7 hearing. Ranger Transp., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 903 F. 2d 1185 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1990 Wal-Mart argues that the district court erred in ordering monetary sanctions for the failure of a Wal-Mart employee, Bryan Banks, to attend a deposition on May 26, 1989. Upon reconsidering its original sanctions order, the district court found that Banks' failure to attend caused Ranger no additional expense because Ranger's attorneys were able to take two other depositions that day, and because Ranger never attempted to reschedule Banks' deposition despite ample opportunity to do so before trial. Nevertheless, the court awarded Ranger $1000 for expenses incurred solely in pursuing the motion for sanctions. Wal-Mart argues that this was an abuse of discretion. We agree. Rule 37(d)'s authorization of monetary sanctions is limited to reimbursement for reasonable expenses and fees "caused by the failure" of a party, or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party, to attend a deposition for which proper notice was given. Because the sole purpose of Ranger's sanctions motion, filed well after trial had ended, was to recover expenses, the district court's finding that no such expenses had been incurred was, in effect, a denial of the motion. We find no authority in the Rules for awarding expenses of pursuing the motion in these circumstances. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) (authorizing award of expenses only for motions that are granted and "necessitated" by other party's conduct). Thus, even if Banks' behavior was subject to sanction under Rule 37(d), the district court abused its discretion in awarding Ranger expenses for pursuing the motion. Bailey v. FELTMANN, Dist. Court, ED Missouri 2014 Defendant's request for fees includes time spent "researching, evaluating, discussing, responding to and otherwise attempting to remediate Plaintiff's failure to attend his own deposition, including but not limited to the preparation of" the instant motion, plaintiff's response thereto, and researching and drafting his reply memorandum. These costs were incurred because defendant elected to take a particularly aggressive response to plaintiff's failure to appear, which the Court finds was not warranted under the circumstances. Further, because defendant's deposition was taken on the same day, defendant's counsel was not put to additional expense merely because plaintiff did not appear.
10 U.S. Code § 332 - Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. 18 U.S. Code § 2101 - Riots 18 U.S. Code § 2102 - Definitions (a) As used in this chapter, the term “riot” means a public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other individual or (2) a threat or threats of the commission of an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having, individually or collectively, the ability of immediate execution of such threat or threats, where the performance of the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a clear and present danger of, or would result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other individual. 18 U.S. Code § 2102 (a)(2)的这个三人或以上集会构成威胁的定义相当灵活.你不需要进行实际暴力行动，只要构成威胁即可镇压. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2069context=vlr The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political Crime: The Need for Criminal Law Theory
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