揭示岳东晓博士对1832年传道士案论述的谬误（2）

第一。法律概念介绍: 传教士的判决和判决法

传教士案件判决（order/judgment/mandate)： 推翻Georgia 法院判刑传教士4年劳教的判决并命令Georgia立刻释放传教士。(“It is therefore ordered and adjudged, that the judgment rendered in the premises, by the said superior court of Georgia, upon the verdict upon the plea of Not guilty afterwards pleaded by the said Samuel A. Worcester, whereby the said Samuel A. Worcester is sentenced to hard labour in the penitentiary of the state of Georgia, ought to be reversed and annulled. And this court proceeding to render such judgment as the said superior Court, of the state of Georgia should have rendered, it is further ordered and adjudged, that the said judgment of the said superior court be, and hereby is reversed and annulled; and that judgment be, and hereby is awarded, that the special plea in bar, so as aforesaid pleaded, is a good and sufficient plea in bar in law to the indictment aforesaid; and that all proceedings on the said indictment do for ever surcease; and that the said Samuel A. Worcester be, and hereby is henceforth dismissed therefrom, and that he go thereof quit without day. And that a special mandate do go from this court, to the said superior court, to carry this judgment into execution.”） 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 596-7).

传教士案件判决法 (holding):  Georgia 要求白人申请在切诺基部落居住执照法律违宪无效。 (“The act of the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.” (31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562.  见Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 269-70 (1959) (“Around 1830 the Georgia Legislature extended its laws to the Cherokee Reservation despite federal treaties with the Indians which set aside this land for them.  The Georgia statutes forbade the Cherokees from enacting laws or holding courts and prohibited outsiders from being on the Reservation except with permission of the State Governor. The constitutionality of these laws was tested in Worcester v. State of Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483, when the State sought to punish a white man, licensed by the Federal Government to practice as a missionary among the Cherokees, for his refusal to leave the Reservation.  Rendering one of his most courageous and eloquent opinions, Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's assertion of power was invalid.” ); 见 Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. State v. Oneida County, New York State, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974) (“For example, in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), the State of Georgia sought to prosecute a white man for residing in Indian country contrary to the laws of the State.  This Court held the prosecution a nullity[.]”)

其他和判决和判决法不相关的都是论证语 (dictum), 没有任何判决执行法律性, 不构成任何先例法律性，高级法院后来的案例中称这是法官Marshall 的陈述，或者观点， 包括最著名的“切诺基部落国是个独特的群体，有自己的领地和邦界， 州政府对部落国的法律无法律效力。即使这些Marshall 法官最著名的陈述或观点，最高法院到1880年的时候已经不在承认部落独立国身份。见Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 735 (1983) (In Worcester  ... Chief Justice Marshall wrote that an Indian reservation “is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which ... [state laws] can have no force ....” Despite this early statement emphasizing the importance of tribal self-government, “Congress has to a substantial degree opened the doors of reservations to state laws, in marked contrast to what prevailed in the time of Chief Justice Marshall,” 见Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74, 82 S.Ct. 562, 570, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962).); 见White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,  448 U.S. 136, 141 （1980) (“Long ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view that “the laws of [a State] can have no force” within reservation boundaries, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832)”.); 见Organized Village of Kake v. Egan， 369 U.S. 60 （1962）(The general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,　...　By 1880 the Court no longer viewed reservations ad distinct nations. On the contrary, it was said that a reservation was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction except as forbidden by federal law.); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751,  763 (1998) (“The general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester ...)

最高法院到1880年已经放弃传教士案件中Marshall 法官针对印第安部落国的陈述或观点，这种最高法院自我陈述放弃的说法进一步证明这不是传教士案件的判决法(holding)，而是论证语。否则，按照最高法院判案程序，必须要明文推翻 (overule) 这个判决法（holding) ，不是轻易放弃Marshall 的观点或立场，而且最高法院推翻先例的频率和天上出现彗星的频率相似。

第二。传道士案件的判决是放人，判决法是Georgia的要求居住执照法律违宪无效。

岳博士说：[Worcester v. 案的意义你在我的提示下现在总算搞清了，不单是传教士是否有罪的问题，而是Georgia  是否有权进入印第安领地。]

这种对该案件的陈述严重违反案件的判决和判决法（holding)，充分说明他对法院判决法和论证语的混淆和迷惑。尽管Marshall 法官写/认为/陈述州政府在没有经过印地安人准许情况下进入领地，但是这是他的论证语[dicta], 而绝对不是案件的判决法。 至于说这个案件的 [意义] 是什么，对判决法来说毫不相关。

第三。传教士案判决对当时其他[各州]或联邦政府没有任何约束力。

岳博士说： [如果各州遵守美国最高法的在Worcester 案中的判决, ... 或者美国政府遵守 最高法的判决，... ]

最普通简单的法理，法院只有对诉讼当事方有管辖权，法院的判决只有对当事方有法律效率。见Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 881 (2008) (“Indicating the strength of that tradition, this Court has often repeated the general rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in litigation in which he is not designated a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”)  这个普通法理建立在美国历史悠久的传统，每个人都有权利在法院保护自己法律权力。 (见 Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (This rule is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’ 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, p. 417 (1981).”）

因为传教士案件的上诉人是两位传教士，被上诉人是Georgia州，因此，该判决只有对Georgia 有约束力，明确要求州法院放人。不停叫嚷当时其他 [各州] 或联邦政府没有遵守这个案件的 [判决]，纯属荒谬无稽之谈。

第四。【这个案件只是要求Georgia 州释放判刑的传教士】

这是我对该案件判决的陈述，完全准确。质疑我这种陈述 [阅读理解力的问题] 充分说明他不知道该案件的判决，判决法，和论证语。除了他缺少必须的专业学习和运用之外，也显示出他的英语阅读理解能力的缺陷。[他声称已经读过《迁移法案》但他没有读出法案中明文规定印地安人易地迁移的自愿性。

第五。指称[切诺基于是在美国法院起诉] （1832）违反事实。

案件的上诉人是白人传教士，不是切诺基部落国。岳博士说，[实际上，Worcester与另外一人拒绝接受赦免，故意受刑、以便上最高法院挑战乔治亚州法违宪。切诺基雇佣了律师为Worcester上诉。]  提出这些背景事实说明他对另外一个法律概念的无知：即，事实和法律事实的区别。法院判案以法律事实为准，呈堂记录之外的任何事实都不能构成影响判决的法律事实。 因此 [切诺基于是在美国法院起诉，结果美国最高法院还判他们赢了（1832年）] 的说法是网络演绎，不是历史事实。他 [通过Worcester是切诺基绕过前一案中的管辖权问题而再论切诺基主权的一招] 的说法是超级网络演绎。

第六。[WORCESTER判决即使执行也不影响印第安人清除]

因为《迁移法案》的明文规定政府在进行易地迁移是印地安人的选择，所以岳博士对该传教士案件的意义将完全失去意义。这是因为，按照他的逻辑，[如果各州遵守美国最高法的在Worcester 案中的判决，或者美国政府遵守最高法的判决，尊重之前与印第安人的条约，那么印第安人根本不需要选择迁移。] 但是，就算是政府没有遵守最高法的判决，那么如果政府遵守《迁移法案》也可以达到 [印第安人根本不需要选择迁移]。 因此，如果传教士判决得以执行，执行后的结果和执行《迁移法案》是重叠的。 由此看来，在岳博士看来如此重要的传道士案件却真正的变成一张废纸，因为这个被错误理解为切诺基提供选择迁移权利的案件，美国国会已经在成文法《迁移法案》明文规定保护。 （“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That it shall and may be lawful for the President of the United States to cause so much of any territory belonging to the United States, west of the river Mississippi, not included in any state or organized territory, and to which the Indian title has been extinguished, as he may judge necessary, to be divided into a suitable number of districts, for the reception of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange the lands where they now reside, and remove there; and to cause each of said districts to be so described by natural or artificial marks, as to be easily distinguished from every other.”） (关键字 as may choose …)

第七。传道士案件判决没有强迫政府[履行保护切诺基的条约]

岳博士说： [美国人的做法是，州政府拒绝执行WORCESTER案精神，继续侵犯印第安人，而联邦政府也拒绝根据ＷＯＲＣＥＳＴＥＲ判决，履行保护切诺基的条约，通过这一手段迫使切诺基签署土地置换条约。]

传道士案件的判决没有要求联邦政府 [履行保护切诺基的条约]的法令，也许美国政府应该这样做。杰克逊总统是律师出身，他知道什么是判决法和是论证语的关系，所以他即使真的[嘲笑了美国最高法院一番]，或者真的[把美国最高法院判决当成一张废纸]， 这也是他宪法保护的总统的权利。因此，岳博士所谓总统嘲笑法院和践踏法院判决的说法是岳博士通过阅读PBS 电台对老百姓普法材料，是普及简易读物，因为没有法理支持。事实上，岳博士提供的PBS普及读物上明确指出杰克逊总统说让法官Marshall 来执行这个判决的说法也许是传说 (apocryphal).  http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/history2.html

[后续]

附录1：http://www.bian-wang.com/discuz/home.php?mod=space&uid=9999&do=blog&id=974&_dsign=f25a17d4

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岳东晓 2015-2-11 12:41 AM
2. Worcester v. 案的意义你在我的提示下现在总算搞清了，不单是传教士是否有罪的问题，而是Georgia  是否有权进入印第安领地。但你认为【这个案件丝毫没有涉及影响当时生效的 [迁移发案]】，又是历史常识的缺乏。Indian Removal Act 表面上是印第安人自愿迁移，需要美国政府与印第安部落签约进行土地置换。如果各州遵守美国最高法的在Worcester 案中的判决，或者美国政府遵守 最高法的判决，尊重之前与印第安人的条约，那么印第安人根本不需要选择迁移。美国政府以及州政府却蔑视最高法的判决，最终实行了强制迁移。

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岳东晓 2015-2-13 04:14 AM

2. 你既然在第一个评论之前读过WORCESTER案原文，却说【这个案件只是要求Georgia 州释放判刑的传教士】，这似乎是阅读理解力的问题。实际上，Worcester与另外一人拒绝接受赦免，故意受刑、以便上最高法院挑战乔治亚州法违宪。切诺基雇佣了律师为Worcester上诉。该案子的 issue 不是申辩Worcester没有违反乔治亚州的法律，而是说乔治亚州对切诺基领地没有管辖权，因此乔治亚的这项法律无效。通过Worcester是切诺基绕过前一案中的管辖权问题而再论切诺基主权的一招。你在看完判决后说【这个案件只是要求Georgia 州释放判刑的传教士】是明显的不得要领。最高法院在那个判决里强调的是切诺基主权不容侵犯以及美国保护切诺基的责任。

3. 你对Indian Removal Act 理解错误，对其作用机制也不了解，乃至以为WORCESTER判决即使执行也不影响印第安人清除。这我已经指出了。美国人的做法是，州政府拒绝执行WORCESTER案精神，继续侵犯印第安人，而联邦政府也拒绝根据ＷＯＲＣＥＳＴＥＲ判决，履行保护切诺基的条约，通过这一手段迫使切诺基签署土地置换条约。假如美国联邦政府执行判决，印第安人根本不需要迁移。

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附录2：

[1]  判决法: Holding 

holding, n. (15c) : A court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision; a principle drawn from such a decision. Cf. OBITER DICTUM. [Cases: Courts  88.] 

Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), holding
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief

[2]  论证语: Obiter dictum

obiter dictum (ob-i-t<>r dik-t<>m). [Latin “something said in passing”] (18c) A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive). — Often shortened to dictum or, less commonly, obiter. Pl. obiter dicta. SeeDICTUM. Cf. HOLDING (1)); RATIO DECIDENDI. [Cases: Courts  92.]

“Strictly speaking an ‘obiter dictum’ is a remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, ‘by the way’ — that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or suggestion.... In the common speech of lawyers, all such extrajudicial expressions of legal opinion are referred to as ‘dicta,’ or ‘obiter dicta,’ these two terms being used interchangeably.” William M. Lile et al., Brief Making and the Use of Law Books 304 (3d ed. 1914).

Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), obiter dictum
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief

[3] 先例：PRECEDENT

precedent (pres-<>-d<>nt), n. (16c) 
1. The making of law by a court in recognizing and applying new rules while administering justice. [Cases: Courts  87.]
2. A decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues. See STARE DECISIS. [Cases: Courts  88.] — precedential, adj.

Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), precedent
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief

2015年2月15日补充 （1）：

他引述的这个案例反证他的立场：  McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973)。

尽管McCLANAHAN案件上描述传教士案件时用了held这个字 , 但是这个案件的上下文足以说明这个用法和法理上的 [判决法]这个含义的 holding 完全不一样。这个held 的含义就是我列举的其他最高法院的案件中指出Marshall认为或观点的含义相同。  至少有三个论据：

第一，第二句话中反指前面的Marshall held 的内容为 一个概念 （this concept 而不是 the holding)  (It followed from this concept of Indian reservations as separate, although dependent nations, that state law could have no role to play within the reservation boundaries.)  (见Merriam-Webster, hold, 7(b): to think of in a particular way)

第二： 紧跟的后面的一个段落里再次指出传教士案件中Marshall 法官的陈述为“论证” - rationale, 这在解析案件是可以理解为和dictum  意义相同的词，因为两个字的意义都是来论证说明holding (判决法）的法律原因。把案件holding 的原因当holding，是法学院一年级学生的通病。

第三： 传教士这个案件在高级法院的案件上还是有效案件 （good law), 因为这个案件的holding 还没有被推翻，但是这个论证语（dictum) 已经放弃，这个案件的holding 还是有效，继续制止任何州试图制定和当年Georgia 州被宣布违宪无效的法律。

2015年2月15日补充（2）

传道市案件中Marshall 首席法官在陈述中暗示或认为Jackson 总统应该但是没有说必须要介入 (“The forcible seizure and abduction of the plaintiff in error, who was residing in the nation with its permission and by authority of the President of the United States, is also a violation of the acts which authorise the chief magistrate to exercise this authority.”)    在这个案件签发之后, 本案大法官Joseph Story 给他的私人朋友George Tichno 1832年3月8日的信里说： ”我不认为总统会介入 。”） （”I do not believe the President will interfere.“)如果Marshall 下令总统执行传道士案件判决（什么判决？）， 那为什么他要在案件中暗示杰克逊总统要介入， 而为什么Story 法官和他的朋友说总统不会介入？

另外，这个传道士案件到底下令总统做什么？ 执行条约和1802年法案是总统的宪法责任和义务？ （见，宪法： ”he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.“)   如果是，为什么还要法院告诉总统他的宪法责任？在这个传教士案件之前，国会就曾经针对杰克逊总统不执行1802年保护印第安部落法案对他质问，他的回答是尽管他有权在印第安部落用武力清除白人入侵者，但是他认为必须在不得已的情形，否则将干预Georgia州内政。

在这个案件签发之后, 国会对首席大法官Marshall 和 Story 法官非常不满，其中Virginia 州参议院 John Randolph 在给Jackson 总统的1832年3月18日的信中讲： “如果我在众议院有一席位，我会启动弹劾首席大法官和Story 法官。” （“If I had a seat in the H. of R., I would move an impeachment of the Ch. J. and Story.“)

上面的资料是从互联网上找不到的，只有来法律图书馆里看到 。初中历史课程上不会有的，初中历史课本上也不是描述共和国成立初期三权分离和三权权利争夺的历史法律实践，依赖初中历史知识也无法理解这个传教士案件的Marshall 法庭和杰克逊总统对立的政治原因。